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  Cornhusker Economics 
Role of Social Networks and Individual Endowments in 
 Meeting Fundraising Targets: An Economic Experiment  
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Social networks have widespread influence by virtue 
of the easy and often low-cost manner in which in-
formation is transmitted through them. For example, 
they can enable diffusion of pro-social behaviors and 
production of public benefits as evidenced by the 
fantastic success of the Amyotrophic Lateral Sclero-
sis (ALS) Ice Bucket Challenge. Recently, the ALS 
Society announced that the funds generated through 
the campaign helped pursue high-risk research and 
produced scientific breakthroughs (Washington Post 
2015). Against the backdrop of such successful initi-
atives, our research investigates the role of infor-
mation obtained about charitable giving behavior of 
one’s social connections on fundraising success, spe-
cifically in situations where funding campaigns in-
volve predetermined targets and where donors have 
different levels of endowments from which they make 
their charitable contributions.  
Our focus on such funding targets is motivated by 
the fact that in many situations public benefits or 
goods may only be feasibly provided in discrete 
quantities or when a particular threshold is reached. 
In some instances, if funds raised are not sufficient to 
meet this threshold, the project is not implemented.  
Also, in the case of many crowd-funding sites, the 
total money raised gets transferred to the individuals 
only when a predefined target is met.   
For this study, we conduct human subject laboratory 
economic experiments. These experiments involve  
controlled settings in which randomly selected stu-
dent subjects make decisions under different experi-
mental conditions on the basis of which they are 
paid. By varying the incentives associated with each 
decision, it is possible for the experimenter to evalu-
ate different types of  behaviors under conditions re- 
March 30, 2016 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  3-25-16 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  .  165.72  132.00  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  280.75  198.24  193.84 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  220.64  165.76  158.93 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  248.92  226.24  226.62 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  55.83  51.55  61.97 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66.49  69.65  76.02 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  144.21  143.71  132.01 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  370.66  359.79  346.31 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.03  3.93  3.87 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  3.75  3.33  3.42 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.22  8.21  8.56 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7.79  5.48  5.61 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.07  2.66  2.42 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  175.00  250.00  200.00 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77.50  82.50  77.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  105.00  85.00  85.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  174.25  134.50  127.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57.00  51.50  52.00 
 ⃰  No Market          
presentative of realistic environments in which fundraising 
activities are implemented. Experiments are specifically 
suited for this study since they can indicate how different 
behaviors dynamically spread on the network, which is 
difficult to isolate from observational field data. Moreover, 
in real life, people’s peer groups change over time so the 
experimental setting can provide a benchmark framework 
for studying behavior in situations where people’s net-
works and peer groups remain unchanged.  
Experimental Design:  
We collected data from 144 student subjects (24 experi-
mental groups in total) who were recruited from the broad 
undergraduate student population of Indiana University 
Bloomington. The experiment involved groups of six peo-
ple who individually decided how much of their endow-
ment of “tokens” (they received each round) they would 
contribute for public good provision. The public good was 
produced if and only if the group as a whole contributed 
120 tokens. If the target was not reached, all the tokens 
were fully refunded back to the group members. The group 
as a whole earned less (and thus enjoyed less benefits) if the 
public good was not funded. Individual payoffs were deter-
mined based on the number of tokens retained in one’s 
personal fund and the total benefit generated if the public 
good was provided.  
During these experiments, we varied the information avail-
able to subjects through their social networks in two ways: 
 In the 12 groups termed LOCAL, the social network 
involved every person having two neighbors (one to 
their left and other to their right) from whom they re-
ceived individual contribution information. 
 In the remaining 12 groups termed COMPLETE, all 
six people were connected to each other and so they 
received contribution information from every group 
member.  
Figure 1 presents these two network structures. Addition-
ally, we varied subjects’ endowment levels to represent the 
fact that in real life, different people have different endow-
ments and hence different abilities to contribute to the 
public good. In 12 groups termed LOW, subjects had an 
endowment of 30 tokens. In the  remaining groups termed 
HIGH, subjects were endowed with 50 tokens. As a result 
of this design specification, we had four types of experi-
mental treatments presented in Table 1.  
Each experiment session had three parts. In Part I, the 
subjects participated in a practice round with no feed-
back on decisions made by other participants. In Parts 
II and III, they interacted with their group members 20 
times or for 20 periods during which they decided how 
much to contribute to the public good. The first 10 peri-
ods (in Part II) served as a baseline during which every-
one received aggregate information about the total 
amount of tokens contributed to the public good (once 
everyone had made their contributions from their en-
dowment). In the remaining 10 periods (Part III), treat-
ment specific (LOCAL or COMPLETE) information 
was provided. This repeated interaction setting is im-
portant for multiple reasons. First, it facilitates people’s 
understanding of the experimental environment so that 
data collected is a result of systematic deliberation ra-
ther than of idiosyncratic decisions. Second, it provides 
evidence about how individuals learn and respond to 
non-monetary dynamic incentives such as reputation 
amongst one’s peers, in different economic environ-
ments.  
Results:  
Figure 2 presents the performance of the groups in 
terms of whether they  are able to meet the funding  
threshold or not. Comparing the size of the grey and 
black bars in Part II and Part III, our first result is that 
HIGH-endowment groups (right set of graphs) are 
more likely to reach the threshold than LOW-
endowment ones (left set of graphs).  Figure 3 plots the 
average group contributions across all 20 periods of the 
game. The graphs indicate that in the later periods of 
Phase III, success depends upon the amount of infor-
mation received about others’ actions – groups are 
more likely to meet the target when people have infor-
mation about everyone’s contributions i.e., under the 
COMPLETE condition than under the LOCAL one. 
This finding is corroborated by statistical analysis. 
Implication: Thus, funding agencies are more likely to 
be successful in communities where people are not con-
strained by their endowments (of income or time rela-
tive to the funding threshold) or the information they 
receive  about the giving  behaviors of  their  social con- 
Endowment 
Level 
InformaƟon 
LOCAL‐Info  COMPLETE‐Info 
LOW  LOW‐LOCAL  
(6 groups) 
LOW‐COMPLETE  
(6 groups) 
HIGH  HIGH‐LOCAL  
(6 groups) 
HIGH‐COMPLETE  
(6 groups) 
Figure 1: LOCAL and COMPLETE InformaƟon Networks 
Table 1: Experimental Design  
nections. With more of both, the public good has a higher 
likelihood of being provided.  
Second, focusing only on the behavior of low endowment 
groups represented by the grey bars in the left panel of  Fig-
ure 2,   we  find  a  statistically  significant  treatment effect
(between LOW-LOCAL and LOW-COMPLETE condi-
tions). Thus, when groups are constrained by their endow-
ments, information about giving behavior of more peers 
increases the chances of reaching funding  targets, relative 
to situations where people have information about fewer 
contacts.  
Implication: Thus when running fundraising campaigns in 
communities where people have lower endowments (of 
time or money), funders may be able to significantly in-
crease  chances of fundraising  success by facilitating infor- 
Figure 2: Percentage of Groups MeeƟng the Threshold with LOW & HIGH Endowments in Part II & Part III 
mation exchange between as many community mem-
bers as possible.  
Finally, in Figure 3 we also observe that there is less var-
iability across periods i.e., fewer instances where groups 
fall short of or overshoot the threshold, in the COM-
PLETE sessions (solid line) than in the LOCAL ones 
(dashed line) irrespective of the endowment value. 
Overshooting the threshold leads to inefficiency since 
tokens contributed above 120 are lost (and don’t accrue 
any income) and undershooting means the group for-
goes the benefits derived from the public good. 
Implication: Thus, devising mechanisms to provide 
people with giving information about all their group 
members can benefit both funders and donors by re-
ducing wasteful contributions beyond the threshold.  
Figure 3: Mean Group ContribuƟons in the Repeated Game in LOW and HIGH Treatments  
Conclusions and Next steps:  
Our study results indicate that success of fundraising out-
comes depends both on the nature of social connections 
that determine the amount of information available about 
other’s giving behaviors as well as the endowments from 
which people make their donations. Thus, a key lesson from 
our study is that fundraising is not a one-size-fits-all en-
deavor. If funding organizations want to streamline their 
activities to achieve their targets at the lowest possible costs, 
they should be mindful of the donor demographic and the 
nature of community relations.  
 
 
 
At this point, we caution the reader about extrapolating 
the results of this controlled and stylized study to real 
life settings. The goal of laboratory experiments is to 
provide important benchmark results that establish 
proof of concept and internal theoretical validity of the 
mechanisms studied. For external validity, greater gen-
eralizability and eventual policy implementation, ex-
perimentation in other related settings and with a non-
student subject pool is essential. This is the subject 
matter of current ongoing research.  
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